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This paper studies a transmission mechanism through 
which pro-vulnerable income transfers may affect 
individual decision-making of non-beneficiaries in 
an extreme poverty context, leading to labor supply 
contraction and the so-called dependency syndrome. 
The argument is based on the distributional distortion 
this transfer may provoke to the relative quality of 
leisure, enjoyed by the population in an extreme poverty 
scenario. Assuming the existence of vulnerable individuals 
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and different income groups based on certain physical, 
economic, or social characteristics, the author studies 
their decision processes and, in particular, their reactions 
to the aid program. The results of this theoretical research 
provide some insights on the conditions that an optimal 
pro-poor income transfer should present. A literature 
review is presented in support of the arguments made in 
the theoretical part. 
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Several  papers  have  analyzed  the  microeconomic  effects  of  income  transfers  targeted  to 
vulnerable  populations  and,  especially,  conditional  cash  transfer  (CCT)  studies  have  become 
increasingly popular: Gaardner, Glassman and Todd (2010) unpack the causal chain between CCTs 
and health; Leroy, Ruel and Verhofstadt (2009) focus on CCTs and child nutrition; and Maluccio, 
Murphy and Regalia (2010) research the relations between the success of CCTs and initial supply 
conditions. 
This paper, related to research in this field, studies one of the microeconomic conditions through 
which  income  transfers  targeted  to  vulnerable  people  can  reduce  labor  supply  and  spark  a 
dependency syndrome.   
 
The argument is based on a distributional effect of pro-vulnerable transfers. Assuming two groups 
defined  in  terms  of  income  level, the  beneficiaries  of the program  (vulnerable)  and  the  non-
beneficiaries (non-vulnerable): we study why a pro-vulnerable transfer to the beneficiary group 
(i.e., foreign aid, national poverty programs, CCT) may provoke a labor supply reduction among 
the non-beneficiaries. Assuming that the program is targeted to all vulnerable individuals, start 
from a traditional neoclassical labor-leisure model, in which the non-beneficiary group reacts to 
the introduction of the aid program, through a “relative reservation constrain” that may become 
binding. In this model for a given income transfer provided to vulnerable people, marginally richer 
individuals  (non-targeted  by  the program)  may  react  by dropping  working  hours  and  become 
involved  in  the  program.  For  this  reason,  we  introduce  an  additional  “relative  reservation” 
constraint, stating that the equilibrium utility level of the non-vulnerable group is higher or equal 
to that of the treated group. 
 
Therefore, we interpret “aid dependency” as a social strategic interaction, rather than as emerging 
from an individual maximization problem. Because the two groups are specified in accordance 
with their income rather than utility, marginally richer individuals (non-beneficiaries) may obtain 
substantial disutility by working for long hours. Therefore, as pro-vulnerable transfers increase the 
beneficiary group’s income, it also increases the “relative reservation” utility level of the non-
beneficiary, and this may affect their utility maximization and lower the non-beneficiary labor 
supply, sparking dependency. 
 
Several researches tend to be rather skeptical of the claim that an income boost (produced by 
income transfers or foreign aid) can produce an increase in the demand for leisure, so-called 
“dependency syndrome”. In this paper, we do not reject this claim, but argue that marginally 
richer individuals (non-beneficiary of aid programs) may introduce strategic behaviors (i.e., reduce 
working  hours)  in  order  to  qualify  as  vulnerable  and  join  the  program.  For  this  reason  the 
distributional  dimension  may  help  disentangling  this  phenomenon  and  enrich  the  individual 
maximization problem. 
  
One of the central papers in this field by Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) introduced “labour 
supply considerations into the targeting of poverty alleviation programs in developing countries”, 3 
 
and shows that “indicator targeting rules may also have to be modified significantly when labour 
supply responses are recognised”. Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2006) analyze the case in which 
labor supply is elastic to aid transfers, through a remarkable theoretical and numerical simulation, 
and find that while tied aid boosts employment time, productivity and economic growth; a pure 
income transfer (like the one that will be analyzed) causes the opposite effects. Similar results are 
found by Gong and Zou (2001): in their optimal growth model with foreign aid and endogenous 
leisure-and-consumption choices, they conclude that a “rise in foreign aid reduces long-run capital 
accumulation and labour supply”.  
 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  the  next  two  sections  present  a  theoretical  view  of  this 
phenomenon and develop it, the third section reviews some case studies and the literature that 




Targeted  income  transfers  respond  effectively  to  two  broad  problems:  how  to  support  the 
vulnerable and how to use limited resources for a broad problem. Two types of targeting can be 
broadly identified (Van de Walle 1998): “broad targeting” which aims to channel public spending 
in a certain sector and “narrow targeting” which directly refers to certain categories of people, 
generally the poor. In this work, we study the effect of a narrow-targeted, pro-vulnerable, income 
transfer program. 
This may be introduced for different reasons (i.e., humanitarian crisis, development project...) and 
through different types, for example foreign aid or national poverty-reduction programs. However 
we start from the assumption that this does not affect the local economy in a variety of ways: 
relative prices, as well as human, land or physical capital, do not change as a result of this change.  
It is important to state that in this paper we will not analyze the dependency led by distortions in 
agricultural  prices,  as  there  is  an  abundant  and  exhaustive  literature  with  this  regards.  For 
example Isenman and Singer (1977) present a review of the transmission mechanisms through 
which food aid affects welfare and labor supply in low-income countries, based on agricultural 
price distortion. 
In this simple model, we analyze a small village
i in a context of extreme povert y, with a given 
population (Pop). For the sake of simplicity, this population is composed of two equally-numbered 
groups, A (non-treated) and B (treated by the pro-vulnerable income transfer program), so that 
Pop=A+B.  Among these groups there are no intra  group differences (     represents  the  same 
income for all the vulnerable, similarly      for all the non-treated). From the traditional relation 
between income (  ), wage rate ( )  and working hours ( ) follows: 
                            
(1) 4 
 
Therefore, given a certain wage per hour equal across the two groups
ii, w, the income earned by 
each group depends exclusively on the amount of working hours,   . Before the aid program, the 
vulnerable group ( ) earns less than the non-vulnerable group ( ), because they work less, so that 
YA>YB  because  LA>LB.  The  reasons  behind  this  can  be  several:  economic  factors  (i.e.,  land 
ownership,  capital  equipment…)  may  expose  vulnerable  individuals  to  a  higher  poverty  risk 
because  of  their  initial  conditions,  health  reasons  (ie.  mutilations,  diseases…)  may  physically 
constrain their working hours, or social conditions (ie. tribal, cast, class…) may force vulnerable  
individuals to less rewarding jobs. 
Assume that this village is involved in a pro-vulnerable income transfer program (which will be 
called  for  simplicity  aid  program)  brought  forward  by  a  certain  domestic  or  international 
organization. This program intends to provide the most vulnerable individuals (B group in this 
model) with some income in order to reach the poverty line (in whichever parameter it is defined). 
This model does not define the amount of aid as a direct (monetary) or indirect (in-kind) transfer, 
because given extreme poverty, people can be assumed to spend all of their income in food, water 
and minimal healthcare.




- Figure 1 - 
On the vertical axis there is daily income per worker, while on the horizontal axis there is population. As previously 
stated, the population is divided in two groups (named A and B and sized A=B=Pop/2), assumed to earn a certain 
equal income within them. Therefore, the representative group A agent earns a daily income YA, is not vulnerable and 
thus  not  treated:  its  condition  is  shown  in  the  first  column;  correspondingly,  group  B  earns  YB  and  represents 
vulnerable people targeted by the program and is represented in the second column. YP refers to the poverty line.  5 
 
Between  the  two  groups,  only  group  B  will  be  eligible  for  the  program,  because  in  group  A 
individuals earn enough to pass the poverty line and be excluded. A fundamental assumption 
behind the model is the perfect information enjoyed by the aid agency, that is able to discern A 
from B agents and capable of intervening only on the latest. In fact, if imperfect information was 
assumed then it would be trivial to argue the relation between needless individuals receiving aid 
and their labor supply reduction. In this work we show that even in presence of perfect treatment 
selection, the interactions between different groups can result in more dependency. 
Therefore the income situation may be sketched in Figure 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, group B individuals earn YB , below the Poverty Line daily income YP, and the 
aid program aims to elevate the living standards of these people by financing the gap between YP 
and YB for B people, corresponding to the shaded area. From this representation an expected 
result emerges. 
Proposition 1 
A  pro-vulnerable  income  transfer  instantaneously  promotes  a  higher aggregate  income  in the 
village.  
Proof  
The total income received by the entire population, before the aid program, was 
                                           
where YPOP0  is the sum of each group's total income, at time 0 before the foreign agency plan. It 
will  be  the  sum  of  the  two  groups'  total  working  hours  multiplied  by  the  hourly  wage.  The 
situation changes in period 1 as it follows: 
                                                           
                              
The new aggregate income is YPOP1 is higher than YPOP1 because of the higher income B group 
receives at time 1 in comparison with time 0, YB1. This new income incorporates the foreign aid 
coming into the community (             ). Therefore an obvious proposition follows: foreign 
aid generates an instantaneous aggregate income growth. 
 
2. The Model 
Given  this  first  well  expected  effect,  this  analysis  parses  the  outcome  of  this  foreign  income 
injection onto group A and analyzes the reactions of marginally richer individuals to the program. 
We will study why group A individuals may give up their extra-work, join the aid safety net and 
“use aid to buy more leisure.” 
v  6 
 
The  fact  that  the  two  groups  present  different  working  hours  (with  LA>LB)  is  caused  by  the 
impossibility for B group to freely allocate their time between labor (L) and leisure (R), like A. 
Indeed, group A and B are composed of individuals identical in their preferences, utility function (it 
will follow that UA=UB=U) and their sole difference lies in the utility maximization, that in the case 
of B group is undertook because of natural/social constraints. 
 Therefore, if a utility function is introduced, such as 
                                        
  
  
            
  
  
    
      
            
 (2) 
we can see that the utility function (Ux) is composed of two arguments, income (Y) and leisure (R) 
and that both positively affect utility. The last two expressions represent: a “natural condition”, 
(2), implying that the individual time of a day (D) is split between work (L) and leisure (R) and that, 
as previously presented, income and consumption are assumed to be equal. While A group is free 
to allocate their time between L and R, B is not.  
Group  B  holds  a  constraint  in  their  working  hours  for  a  series  of  different  reasons  (diseases, 
relatively smaller fields, social norms...), that generates a difference in their maximization process. 
Therefore their maximization can be expressed through: 
                    
                            
                                 
         
  
  
    
the impossibility to work more than      or, as imposed into the budget constrain, the impossibility 
to rest less than      , does not allow them to choose any better alternative allocation then (    ,     ) 
and  thus  generates  an  income      .  Differently  group  A  undertakes  a  typical  unconstrained 
maximization and Figure 2 shows a possible result generated by this difference.  7 
 
 
- Figure 2 – 
On the vertical axis there is daily income per worker and working hours, while on the horizontal axis there are leisure 
hours. We can see that the position A, which represent the maximization for A people is Pareto-preferred to B, 
because it is on a higher utility curve. 
 
From Figure 2 it is clear that the A group enjoys a higher utility than B, except the case in which A 
and B decisions coincide and thus their utility is equal. Therefore we can see that before any aid 
program there is an implicit condition on the relative utility between group A and group B, stating 
that marginally richer individuals enjoy a utility level higher or equal than vulnerable individuals. 
This  condition  emerges  naturally  from  the  fact  that  vulnerable  individuals  hold  a  certain 
constraint. 
2.1 The aid program 
The  introduction  of  pro-vulnerable  income  transfers  may  subvert  the  condition  stating  that 
marginally richer individuals enjoy a higher or equal utility than vulnerable ones. Because transfers 
affect the income of the vulnerable without affecting their equilibrium labor-leisure position
vi, 
marginally  richer  (non -beneficiary)  individuals  may  lose  the  “advantage  of  unconstrained 
optimization”. In fact, it may be possible that given the disutility of working longer hours (as the 
position A in Figure 2 implies), non-beneficiary individuals may decide to decrease their labor 
supply in order to join the aid safety net. In this case the emergence of dependency is due to an 
explicit  constraint  emerging  in  the  non-  beneficiary  (group  B)  maximization,  which  we  define 
“minimum leisure” condition (or MILE condition). 8 
 
In order to describe the MILE condition, it is useful to define an intuitive measure of “leisure 
quality”. As described in Figure 1, it is known that                , given YP as the poverty line daily 
income.  Holding  the  quantity  of  leisure  constant  across  people,  a  marginally  richer  individual 
enjoys a higher income-intensive leisure and therefore a higher quality of leisure relatively to 
lower-income individuals.  In  this  model,  such measure  will  be  introduced  through this  simple 
index:  
          
   
   
                   
(3) 
where (3) reports a measure of the quality and quantity of leisure enjoyed by people, which will be 
called leisure quality units. It is specified as a multiplication between the net hours of  leisure 
enjoyed by a person X (   - quantitative component) and a ratio between the current income of 




 - qualitative component). In this simple model, in 
which the focus of our analysis is an extreme poverty context, it might be sensitive to assume this 
QRX to be simply linear, as it should roughly represent a rule evaluating the quality of the single 
units (hours) of leisure enjoyed by people. QRX implies that the lower is the income earned by the 
individual relatively to the poverty line income, the worse its leisure time is, to the point that 
   
    
          
   
   
       
as income tends to zero, the leisure quality units go to zero as well. 
 
In order to depict graphically this concept, it is sufficient to report a figure presenting income and 
leisure quality units before and after the aid program, in order to understand the emergence of 
the minimum leisure (MILE) condition. For notational simplicity we define                as the 




- Figure 3 - 
On the vertical axis there is daily income per worker, while on the horizontal axis there are the leisure quality units 
QRX. This graph reports the equilibrium positions before the aid program for both the vulnerable individuals (group B) 
and the marginally richer ones (group A). 
 
- Figure 4 - 10 
 
On the vertical axis there is daily income per worker, while on the horizontal axis there are the leisure quality units 
QRX. This graph reports the equilibrium positions after the aid program, expressed with              , for both the 
vulnerable individuals (group B) and the marginally richer ones (group A). 
Figure 3 shows that, before the aid program, marginally richer (A) individuals were enjoying a 
better position than vulnerable ones (B). However as Figure 4 reports, there may be cases in which 
the  aid  program  may  provoke  a  preference  switch,  so  that  being  treated  by  the  program 
(vulnerable) is more convenient than being untreated. 
Given this explanation, we can make explicit the minimum leisure condition that marginally richer 
individuals internalize in their utility maximization. Such an MILE condition can be expressed as 
                    
   
   
          
    
   
  
           
    
   
  
(4) 
Therefore, as (4) reports, the utility of marginally richer (A) individuals will be higher than that of B 
(vulnerable) individuals, if and only if    will be higher than      multiplied by a term expressing the 
income gap between the two groups. The economic sense is simple, a person will work more if this 
incremental income guarantees higher living conditions (a higher quality of its leisure in this case), 
taking into account also the disutility from longer work.  
When  the  pro-vulnerable  income  transfer  program  is  introduced,  the  income  received  by 
vulnerable individuals grow and this affects the condition as follows 
           
        
   
  
Recalling the relations reported in (1) and (2), we may rewrite this condition as follows 
           
         
   
  
           
              
        
  
dividing both terms for   and  , it leads to the final minimum leisure (MILE) condition: 
           
        
     
  





(5) explicitly incorporates a constrain on the relative quality of leisure between vulnerable (A) and 
marginally richer (B) individuals.  
At this point,  we may focus on  the maximization of  group A after the pro-vulnerable income 
transfer program, including the MILE condition. It is important to highlight that we assume that 
given a certain wage rate w and a given constraint on vulnerable individuals (    ), the aid program 
( ) does not alter the maximization of group B individuals. Therefore the optimal constrained 
labor-leisure position for vulnerable individuals (         ) is the same in presence or absence of aid 
programs  and  this  is  taken  as  a  given  condition  in  the  maximization  of  marginally  richer 
individuals, expressed through the MILE condition. 
2. A Relatively Constrained Maximization 
In this section we develop analytically the utility maximization for marginally richer individuals in a 
context of extreme poverty (the A group discussed in the paper), assuming that the decisions of B 
people are taken as a priori determined. The MILE condition is the second constrain and reports 
     as the predetermined quantity of leisure hours decided by group B individuals. 
It  is  important  to  clarify  that  the  nature  of  these  variables  (all  of  them  strictly  positive), 
significantly simplifies the maximization process and the application of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
                 
                             
      
        
     
  
     
          
                         
                                
We can write the Lagrangian function  
                                         
        
     
  
     
       
on which Kuhn-Tucker’s conditions are applied 
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given that         and         , then 1 and 2 hold with equalities and therefore 
                  
    
   
   
              
    
   
                      
        
     
  
       
      
from 1 we conclude that       , by assumption on the utility function concavity. Focusing on 2., we can 
see that 
    
   
 
    
   
                  
        
     
  
       
        
    
   
 
    
   
       
       
                   
     
   
       
        
      
    
   
   
    
   
  
       
                         
     
   
  
Therefore the term     is higher than zero if two conditions hold, the first is implied by 
    
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
   
                             
(6) 
and given that work and leisure are both normal goods with a positive marginal utility and that 
more income is implied by more work and less leisure, the expression 
   
     is negative and given the 
hypothesis on  , we proofed that (6) is always verified. 
The second depends on the following inequality 
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which implies that 
                                  
and that 
                    





      
                           
 
 
      
                      
 
 
                            
(7) 
Given that             ,                         and      , condition (7) is verified and therefore 
we conclude that       . 
Regarding the forth condition in the maximization process, we know that 
      
        
     
  
     
          
Given that                       are all positive by definition, this is  
          
            
 
     
  
Condition 4 is always verified when there is no aid transfer to vulnerable individuals,      , in fact 
 
    
 
    
 
                         
This condition is always true given the assumption that vulnerable individuals hold a constrain on 
their  resting  hours  such  that           and  as  a  result          .  Therefore  the  left-side  of  this 
condition is always higher than one, while the right-side is always lower than one; except the case 
in  which  marginally  richer  individuals  choose  to  work  as  much  as  vulnerable  individuals  for 
exogenous reasons (implied by   or their utility function characteristics) and thus this condition is 
verified with an equality. 
However when some income is distributed to vulnerable individuals,      , then condition 4 is 
verified only for given values of the pro-vulnerable income transfer,  , in fact 14 
 
 
    
   
            
 






    





    
           
This leads to the final condition on income transfer 
   
 
    
           
and because it is feasible to believe that marginally richer individuals are not neutral between 
hard-work and joining the aid program, we define this condition only as a strict inequality 
   
 
    
            
(8) 
Condition (8) is extremely important and represents the core of this paper. In fact, within the 
assumptions of this model, it reports the optimal conditions under which the program of pro-
vulnerable income transfers should be set. The optimal aid transfer is positively dependent on the 
leisure relative weigh,
 
    
 , so that the larger the leisure gap between non-beneficiaries and the 
vulnerable, the higher the income transfer can be. It is also positively related with the income of 
marginally richer individuals: the higher is their income (group A) and the higher the optimal 
transfer can be. Finally, it negatively depends on the vulnerable individuals’ income,      , the higher 
group B income is, the lower the transfer needs to be. 
This condition is consistent with a number of critics: if the income difference between the two 
groups  is  very  high,  then  inter-group  externality  caused  by  the  aid  program  is  possibly  not 
relevant.  Secondly,  in  a  multi-income  group  village  it  is  sensitive  to  think  that  only  those 
individuals  who  are  “marginally”  beyond  the  poverty  line  (in  whichever  way  defined  by  the 
program), react to the program by dropping their labor supply. Recalling (8) and the definition of 
the pro-vulnerable  transfer,               ,  we  can  give  a  condition on  which  individuals  in  the 
village are affected by the program. 
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Condition  (9)  states  that  all  individuals  presenting  an  income  higher  than  the  poverty  line, 
multiplied by their leisure gap with vulnerable individuals, are not affected in their labor-leisure 
decisions by the aid program. While for all individuals whose income is equal or lower than the 
left-hand side of (9), the MILE condition becomes relevant and endogenous to their labor-leisure 
preferences. 
2.1 Targeting and policy implications 
It is very important to highlight that the fundamental argument of this paper lies in demonstrating 
that pro-vulnerable transfers in an extreme poverty context may result in dependency, because 
non-beneficiaries may adopt strategic behaviors that result in dependency. 
In a sense, the results of this paper may flow in the vast literature on aid targeting, suggesting that 
income distribution and the quality of leisure may matter as well. However, the point that we 
would  like  to  stress  is  the  importance  not  only  to  levels  (income,  land  ownership,  capital 
equipment…) but especially to distributions. In fact, in this paper we introduced rigid assumptions 
that  avoided  the  emergence  of  dependency  led  by  labor  supply  contraction  of  vulnerable 
individuals.  Conversely,  the  “marginally  richer”  individuals  make  the  difference  and  might  be 
among the causes of failure for some aid programs. 
We defined vulnerability in terms of income and presented it through economic factors (i.e. land 
ownership, capital equipment…), health reasons (i.e. mutilations, diseases…) or social conditions 
(i.e. tribal, cast, class…). It might be correctly stated that the policy implications of this work lead 
to prefer the targeting of economic/health/social indicators, rather than income. However we are 
aware that targeting should not be treated in a simplistic way. Besley and Kanbur (1993) show that 
several kinds of cost make targeting expensive and difficult: administration and data collection, 
incentive effects or behavioral responses, and costs that result from the consequences of political 
economy.  
As Besley and Kanbur state the “ideal solution” lies somewhere between perfect targeting and a 
universal approach, while Van De Walle (1998) argues that narrow targeting programs (i.e., the 
one analyzed in this paper) is not necessarily preferable to broad targeting interventions (i.e., 
targeting spending sectors). All in all, targeting should not be considered a panacea and for this 
reason, given the theoretical contribution of this paper, we hope to provide some stimuli to the 





3. A Review of the Empirical Literature on Aid and Dependency 
The aim of this section is to look at the evidence that may indicate that aid programs can exert 
some distributional distortions that  lead  to  changes  in the  labor  supply.  This  is  done  for two 
reasons, firstly to show that there is a controversial debate on whether production unrelated cash 
flows (like pro-vulnerable income transfers, aid or remittances) tend to alter both individual and 
social decision making, and secondly in order to encourage more empirical research in verifying 
the theoretical statement developed in this piece of research. 
The  empirical  literature  studying  the  distortions  generated  by  aid  is  definitely  wide.  The 
approaches to reporting this phenomenon are of three types: anecdotal, numerical and empirical. 
The former reports mainly case studies and views expressed in reports or media: they may be 
heavily  influenced  by  the  reporters’  opinion,  though  in  most  cases  this  represents  the  most 
powerful informative tool we can dispose of. The numerical one generally calibrates a model (i.e. 
computer general equilibrium) with parameters coming from some econometric estimation: it can 
provide relevant insights, but often leads to results largely dependent on the model’s assumption 
and analyzed transmission channels. The empirical one, developed through the house-hold survey 
data analysis can be very powerful, especially if it presents a credible identification strategy.  
In  support  of  the  distribution  distortion  channel  developed  in  this  paper,  some  controversial 
pieces of evidence can be reported. For example, a report by Groupe URD (2005) on Afghanistan, 
states  that  some  communities  did  modify  their  collective  behaviors  upon  receiving  external 
assistance  (rising unemployment,  public  good maintenance  suspension).  The  case  of Northern 
Kenya in 2006 is also explicative: Thilo Thielke (2006) reported in Der Spiegel that after a drought 
European  food  aid  almost  replaced  the  regional  agricultural  activity  and  that  in  the  town  of 
Loiyangalani and surrounding province more than 20,000 people were fed everyday free of charge 
over a population of roughly 40,000. Niger in 2005 is another case, as the New York Times article 
stated in “Niger, Hungry Are Fed, but Farmers May Starve” (Burley 2005), the displacement of 
farmers and the unbalanced disincentives toward seeking free food, rather than working, badly 
affected Niger, so far that the President Tandja deeply criticized UN aid agencies. Somalia and the 
establishment  of  its  refugee  camps  were  another  controversial  case  in  the  1980s,  that  may 
exemplify  a  dependency  transmission  channel  like  the  one  previously  reported.  For  example, 
Tucker (1982), a former refugee assistance worker in a Somali camp, reported some statements 
that anecdotally match the ideas developed in this paper  
 
“men no longer want to return to the tenuous existence of the nomad 
or  dryland  farmer,  living  constantly  on  the  razor’s  edge  of  survival. 
Whereas they once collected their drinking water from the muddy river, 
they have now become accustomed to the fresh, clear water provided 
by diesel pumps and water tankers. Meanwhile their children grow up 
in the culture of dependency and learn no other way of life”.  
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On the same subject, but through a rigorous analysis, Farzin (1991) concludes that “Somalia still 
depends heavily on imported food, and especially food aid, as a result of donor continuation of ill-
planned  food  aid  programs”.  In  fact,  Farzin  concludes  that  the  insufficient  aid  organization, 
combined with a disequilibrium between food aid assistance and little farmer support produced a 
vicious circle that imprisoned Somalia in a growing dependency. For Cote d’Ivoire, an analysis 
involving different aid types and savings, Ouattara (2007) finds that “aid tends to worsen Cote 
d’Ivoire’s dependence”.  
 
Ethiopia is a pretty well researched country, for which we would like to report four studies. The 
first is an anecdotal report by Salisbury (1992), narrating that Ethiopians remarkably altered their 
behavior (giving up their work, planting trees upside down), in order to secure the extension of the 
international food aid programs. These behaviors are totally consistent with our hypothesis and 
represent a form of “community moral hazard”. The second comes from an interesting household-
survey study on food aid targeting in Ethiopia, (Clay et al 1999) which reports that there is “no 
significant  association  between  household  food  availability  (need)  and  food  aid  receipts”  and 
recognize  that  “research  is  also  needed  to  examine  the  potential  disincentive  effects  that 
observed  targeting  errors  may  exert”.  Another  household  survey  research  always  on  Ethiopia 
(Jayne et al : 2002) concludes that “the single most important determinant of whether a wereda 
(county)  receives  free food or food for  work  is  whether that  wereda  has been  a  recipient  in 
previous years. On its face, it is unclear whether historical use should be interpreted as indicating 
that inertia is determining allocations”. These two conclusions may be consistent with the result 
implying that in presence of badly targeted aid programs, needless people may react by joining the 
safety net and dropping work hours, so that it is unsurprising to find that needless individuals 
receive aid transfers. The last, which somehow, concludes on this case was prepared by Abdulai et 
al. (2004) stating that “the disincentive effects of food aid on household behaviours are many, 
large in magnitude and statistically significant. However, when we take into account household 
characteristics such as age, sex and education of head, land holdings, size and location, many of 
these adverse effects vanish”.  
 
Sri Lanka’s targeted food stamp program presents a notable example supporting the hypothesis 
behind this work. In order to replace an old general food subsidy, a pro-poor food stamp program 
was introduced and, as Sahn and Alderman (1995) discovered, there was a significant and strong 
reduction in the number of working hours by targeted individuals in order to maintain themselves 
in the program. 
 
Though  the  literature  in  this  field  is  progressively  growing,  there  is  still  too  little  stress  on 
rigorously identifying the impacts of aid programs, especially income transfer programs, on key 
variables like labor supply, private insurance, savings, accumulation and their relation with income 
distribution. As this model shows, a significant cause of dependency may lie in the decision making 
of  those  individuals  whom  are  not  treated  by  the  program,  but  find  convenient  to  join  the 
program by dropping their labor supply. Clearly, because at the moment we do not dispose of 18 
 
useful data sources, this assumption cannot be empirically verified; however we believe that this 
work may encourage further research in this field. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper adds to a large literature on the impact of income transfers and dependency, proposing 
a transmission mechanism based on distributive aspects. The core of our explanation is based on 
the alteration of the minimal leisure (MILE) condition, that may lead to changes in the decision 
making of those individuals who are not originally targeted, but may find convenient to alter their 
decisions and join the program (dropping work hours).  
The theoretical results of this paper argue that even when a project enjoys perfect information 
and  manages  to  well  distinguish  between  who  needs  help,  there  may  be  some  unexpected 
distributional distortions leading to altering social dynamics and creating dependency.  
The empirical literature on this topic is controversial. There is a solid body of anecdotal evidence 
supporting the “dependency syndrome” generated by social dynamics which are consistent with 
our  explanation.  However  the  empirical  literature  is  still  affected by  paucity  and  the  body  of 
empirical papers analyzing aid projects’ impact on labor supply and income distribution, especially 
in low-income countries and extreme poverty scenarios, is not sufficient to define a consensus of 
the  discipline.  We  would  like  to  add  our  voice  to  that  of  authors  who  have  asked  for  more 
research on this field in the hope that it would encourage posing the fundamental questions that 
are at the center of the development research agenda. 
 
                                                           
ENDNOTES 
 
i  The assumption behind the village size is introduced in order to avoid, in the simplest case, or minimize general equilibrium  
effects.  
ii The assumption on hour wage equality may be sensible considering a context of very poor communities, in  which the marginal 
productivity is generally low and the working hours may make the income difference. 
iii With this assumption we do not intend to deny the importance of the research on the effects of in-kind versus cash aid, there is a 
large and important literature studying these phenomena for example Basu (1996) and Faminow (1995) for a review of this subject. 
With this assumption we only intend to reduce the degree of complexity and offer a simple analytical framework for studying t he 
distributional impact of aid on microeconomic behaviors. 
iv This hypothesis may be realistic for very low income levels (like the village under analysis), in which people's incomes rang e 
around the poverty line but do not exceed it by a significant degree. 
v Please refer to Andersen, Christensen and Tejerina (2005).                         
vi If the aid program  affected vulnerable individuals labor-leisure decision (which given these assumptions can only result in an 
increase in leisure hours), this would fall within the typical individually-explained dependency theory which is heavily debated in 
the literature. 
vii The qualitative term 
   
   
  simply weighs the person's income relatively to the poverty income. YP was chosen as term because 
“defines the poverty line by finding the consumption expenditures or income level at which a person’s typical food energy intake is 
just sufficient to meet a predetermined food energy requirement”, please refer to Ravallion (1992) and to the the World Bank Poverty 
Analysis page World Bank Page on Poverty Lines. Hence a person who earns less than it (         ) is likely not to “enjoy” this time and 
simply suffers for longer, or economically speaking enjoying a low quality of leisure, or less leisure quality units. Clearly the weigh 
   
   
 
will be lower than one if the individual income does not reach the poverty line and be higher than one if it exceeds this indicator. In 
this way the quality leisure unit measure becomes also an indicator of the individual welfare. 
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